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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
TITLE III OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
ACT: CONSTITUTIONALLY SAFE AN] SOUND
On November 12, 1996, News Channel 30 in St. Louis reported the
following four stories at the inception of its broadcast:
* Mr. Baumruk, a man who was convicted in 1992 of killing his wife in a
Missouri courthouse during divorce proceedings, was being considered for
release from the mental health hospital to which he was confined after
successfully pleading temporary insanity.
* A woman expressed fear for her life because Mr. Pennington, her former
husband who was convicted of shooting her after she told him she wanted a
divorce, was out on temporary release before sentencing.
* Drill Sergeant Blakely at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, was being
charged with aggravated sexual assault.
* The sexual harassment and sexual assault investigation within the army
was uncovering numerous stories at the base in Aberdeen, Maryland.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1994, Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA"),2
which was created to address "the escalating problem of violence against
women."3 As part of this measure, Congress established a federal civil rights
cause of action4 for victims of violent crimes5 motivated by gender.6 The
1. Ten O'Clock News (KDNL television broadcast, Nov. 12, 1996). This summary was derived
partly from notes taken by the author during the broadcast and was checked against and expanded by
the information generously provided by Rick Brown, News Director, Channel 30.
2. The VAWA was part of the Violent Crime Control snd Law Enforcement Act of 1994, PuB.
L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796.
3. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 37 (1993).
4. 42 U.S.C.A. § 13981(b)-(c) (1995). Section (b) states: "All persons within the
United States shall have the right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by gender."
Id. Section (c) states:
A person (including a person who acts under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage of any State) who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender and thus deprives
another of the right declared in subsection (b) of this section shall be liable to the party injured, in
an action for the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief,
and such other relief as a court may deem appropriate.
Id.
5. The term "crime of violence" means-
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purpose of this remedy, which constitutes Title III of the VAWA, is to
"protect the civil rights of victims of gender motivated violence and to
promote the public safety, health, and activities affecting interstate
commerce. 7
In the summer of 1996, the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut heard Doe v. Doe,8 in which the defendant claimed that Title III
was unconstitutional because Congress did not have the authority to enact it
under the Commerce Clause.9 The court rejected the defendant's claim and
(A) an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony against the person or that would constitute
a felony against property if the conduct presents a serious risk of physical injury to another, and that
would come within the meaning of State or Federal offenses described in section 16 of Title 18,
whether or not those acts have actually resulted in criminal charges, prosecution, or conviction and
whether or not those acts were committed in the special maritime, territorial, or prison jurisdiction
of the United States; and
(B) includes an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony described in subparagraph (A)
but for the relationship between the person who takes such action and the individual against whom
such action is taken.
42 U.S.C. A § 13981(d)(2) (1995).
6. Crime of violence motivated by gender means "a crime of violence committed because of
gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender."
Although the Act is titled the Violence Against Women Act because women disproportionately suffer
gender-motivated crimes, see S. REP. NO. 138, at 37, and the funding of services and programs is
consequently directed at women, see id. at 42-47, the "motivated by gender" language under Title III is
gender neutral and covers men as well. Because the Act was created in response to violence against
women, however, this article will focus on and talk in terms of violence against women. For a
discussion of crimes that disproportionately affect women and the increasing "gender gap" in violence,
see George P. Choundas, Neither Equal Nor Protected: The Invisible Law of Equal Protection, the
Legal Invisibility of Its Gender-Based Victims, 44 EMORY L.. 1069, 1083-86 (1995). See also W.H.
Hallock, The Violence Against Women Act: Civil Rights for Sexual Assault Victims, 68 IND. L.J. 577,
578 (1993) (stating that 97% of all sex crime victims are women) (citation omitted).
7. 42 U.S.C.A. § 13981(a) (1995).
8. Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn 1996).
9. Id. at 610; see 42 U.S.C.A. § 13981(a) (1995). The scope of this Recent Development is
limited to the constitutionality of the VAVA under the Commerce Clause. This Recent Development
will not address whether the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress's additional basis of authority, grants
Congress the power to enact the VAWA. For a discussion of this issue, see Brzonkala v. Virginia
Polytechnic and State University, 935 F. Supp. 779, 793-801 (W.D. Va. 1996); Brief for Intervenor-
Appellant United States at (12-16), Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State Univ., (4th Cir.) (No.
96-1814, 96-2316) [hereinafter Intervenor Brief], available at <http://www.soconline.org/LEGAL/
BRZONKALA> (visited Apr. 7, 1997); and Brief for Appellant, Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and
State Univ., (4th Cir.) (No. 96-1814, 96-2316) [hereinafter Brzonkala Brief], available at
<http://www.soconline.orgLEGAIJbrzonkala> (visited Apr. 7, 1997); David Frazee, An Imperfect
Remedy for Imperfect Violence: The Construction of Civil Rights in the Violence Against Women Act,
1 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 163, 171-87 (1993). See generally Choundas, supra note 6. At least one
author has argued that Congress could alternately achieve some of the VAVA's goals under its
Spending Clause power, by allocating the money attached to the VAWA on the condition that the
states enact stricter penalties for crimes of violence against women. See Michelle W. Easterling, For
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held that Title III was a valid exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause
power.'" Approximately one month later, however, the United States District
Court for the Western District of Virginia heard the same constitutional
challenge in Brzonkala" v. Virginia Polytechnic and State University2 and
ruled that Title III was unconstitutional. 3 Although the Doe case has settled, 4
the Brzonkala case is being appealed" and other courts are certain to have the
same issue presented to them. The outcome of these decisions will determine
whether the victims of gender-based violent crime will be able to vindicate
their rights by suing the perpetrator in a federal forum or will have to rely on
state actions and available remedies. t6 This distinction is not only related to
personal empowerment, which is critical in these kinds of cases, 7 but is also
Better or Worse: The Federalization of Domestic Violence, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 933, 951-52 (1996).
For a policy-based critique of Title III, see Wendy R. Willis, The Gun is Always Pointed: Sexual
Violence and Title III of the Violence Against Women Act, 80 GEO. L.J. 2197, 2201 (1992) (stating that
the "bill does not acknowledge that the majority of sexual assault is gender motivated ... [and that] by
adopting traditional definitions of rape used in criminal law, the bill may require the plaintiff to
demonstrate violence beyond the sexual assault itself'); Frazee, supra, at 213 (contending that Title
III's use of the traditional civil rights model for gender-motivated violence "constructs legal identities
in ways that might harm women" and "does not address the reality of gender-based violence"); and
Sara E. Lesch, A Troubled Inheritance: An Examination of Title III of the Violence Against Women Act
in Light of Current Critiques of Civil Rights Law, 3 COLUM. J. GEND. & L. 535, 539-42 (1993)
(claiming that Title III proves inadequate for victims who fall into more than one category that is
protected against discrimination, focuses on an inappropriate intent requirement, and has a limited
impact on systemic inequities).
For suggestions for amending Title III in response to some of these policy critiques, see Frazee,
supra, at 241-56.
10. Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 617.
11. The plaintiffs name is pronounced "braun-ka-la"-the "z" is silent. Brzonkala Brief, supra
note 9, at 1.
12. 935 F. Supp. 779 (1996).
13. Id.at793,801.
14. Telephone Interview with Patricia Broderick, Special Counsel to the Office of Violence
Against Women (Dec. 18, 1996).
15. See generally Brzonkala Brief, supra note 9; Intervenor Brief, supra note 9.
16. See Developments in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV.
1498, 1530-43 (1993) (analyzing variety of state actions available to victims of gender-based crimes)
[hereinafter Developments].
17. See Frazee, supra note 9, at 254 (explaining that civil rights actions provide groups
"traditionally powerless in the legal system" with "at least limited power to control the process and to
place themselves ... against their attackers. Criminal trials, when they do occur, are often hostile
settings for victims of gender-motivated violence: they may find themselves under more scrutiny than
the defendant and have little, if no, say over the strategy which the prosecution pursues") (citation
omitted); Lesch, supra note 9, at 539 ("This cause of action would counteract the negative effects of a
criminal justice system that can be patronizing and insensitive to the needs of women who have been
victimized by violence. By letting the survivor ... control the course of her case ... the case itself
would become part of the remedy that functions to restore equality."); Willis, supra note 9, at 2200
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
filled with practical meaning, given the severe inadequacies of states' current
responses and remedies.' Furthermore, the existence of Title III has crucial
symbolic meaning,'9 and perhaps related practical implications,20 by helping
dictate whether society overtly recognizes such crimes as meriting as much
outrage as bias-motivated crimes against other groups."2
Part II of this Recent Development briefly reviews the legislative history
behind the VAWA, placing particular emphasis on the history related to Title
III. Part IMI summarizes the analyses of the Doe and Brzonkala cases and then
critiques their analyses in light of the VAWA's legislative history, the
Supreme Court's recent Commerce Clause case United States v. Lopez, and
other Commerce Clause cases. Part III concludes that Title Ill is a valid
exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause power.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY22
A. Congressional Findings
The Violence Against Women Act was first introduced in 1990,23 was
("The Senate Judiciary Committee recognizes that 'the victims of this violence are reduced to symbols
of group hatred [with] no individual power to change or escape. The violence not only wounds
physically, it degrades and terrorizes, instilling fear and inhibiting the lives of all those similarly
situated."') (footnote omitted) (quoting S. REP. No. 102-197, at 43 (1991)).
18. See infra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
19. See Lesch, supra note 9, at 539 ("[Tlitle III imbues the struggle for gender parity with a
prominence and priority that our government appropriately accords to only a few issues....
Federalizing this issue would send a powerful message that the violent enforcement of a gender caste
system will not be tolerated."); see also infra note 20 and accompanying text.
20. See infra Part II.B (discussing the hope of Title I supporters that the provision will help to
change attitudes about gender-motivated violence); see also Lesch, supra note 9, at 539; Elizabeth M.
Schneider, Epilogue: Making Reconceptualization of Violence Against Women Real, 58 ALB. L. REV.
1245, 1250 (1995) (contending that "deep problems of denial and resistance to integrating insights
about domestic violence into both individual behavior and social policy... stand in the way of social
change, and the way in which these attitudes are reinforced by traditional concepts of privacy"); cf.
Violence Against Women: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice of the
Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 102d Cong. 8 (1992) ("1 might add a point on
that study [from Rhode Island that the Chairman] mentioned ... where it said one-quarter of all the
young men ofjunior high school age believed that if a man spends $10 on a woman he is entitled to
force sex on her. That is startling. What is even more startling is that one-fifth of the girls thought the
same thing ... We have a cultural problem in this country") (statement of Sen. Biden) [hereinafter
Violence Against Women Hearing].
21. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
22. For a detailed description of the legislative history through most of 1993, see S. REP. No.
138, at 39-41 (1993) and H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 28-29 (1993).
23. H.R. REP. No. 395, at 28 (1993).
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reintroduced in 1991 and 1993,24 and was finally passed in 1994. From 1990
to 1994, extensive hearings were held on the bill regarding the prevalence and
impact of violence against women.2 ' For example, Congress learned that
between 1988 and 1992, violence was the "leading cause of injury to women
ages 15 to 44, more common than automobile accidents, muggings, and
cancer deaths combined., 26 As of 1988, three out of four American women
were likely to be the victims of violent crimes in their lifetime.27 Moreover,
the rate of violent crimes against women has been increasing.2 For example,
between 1988 and 1992, the rate of incidence of rape rose four and a half
times as fast as the total crime rate9--meaning one rape every five minutes.3"
Estimates of the rate at which rape is reported indicate that only seven
24. Id.
25. See Violence Against Women Hearing. supra note 20; STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON
JUDICIARY, 102D CONG., 2D SESS., VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: A WEEK IN THE LIFE OF AMERICA
(Comm. Print 1992) [hereinafter Comm. Print]; H.R. REP. No. 103-395; S. REP. No. 103-138; see also
infra note 72 and accompanying text.
26. H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 25 (citation omitted).
27. Id. (citing U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE NATION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE 29 (2d
ed. 1988)).
28. Congress heard that since 1974, "the rates for assault and many other violent crimes against
women have increased dramatically, while the rates for the same crimes against men have actually
declined." 139 Cong. Rec. H 10,363 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993) (statement of Sally Goldfarb) (citations
omitted), quoted in Easterling, supra note 9, at 938-39.
29. H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 25 (citing FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T. OF
JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 7, 25 (1992)).
30. Id. A 1992 study found that approximately 12.1 million- or 13 percent-of women, had
experienced a minimum of one forcible rape during their lifetime. Angela Browne, Family Violence
and Homelessness: The Relevance of Trauma Histories in the Lives of Homeless Women, 63 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 370, 370 (1993) (citation omitted). In 1991, 106,593 completed forcible rapes and
153,120 rapes were reported. ADAM DORBIN ET. AL., STATISTICAL HANDBOOK ON VIOLENCE IN
AMERICA 44, 56 (1996). (The Handbook only includes rapes against women in these and the following
statistics.) Between 1981 and 1982, and between 1992 and 1993, the number of reported rapes
declined slightly; otherwise, the number of rapes has steadily increased since 1960. Id. Of completed
rapes, 13.7% were committed by a spouse, 5.1% by an ex-spouse, 2.6% by another relative, 39.5% by
a well-known but unrelated person, 28.5% by a casual acquaintance, and only 10.6% by a stranger. Id.
at 65. In 1993, there were 416,590 reported rapes and sexual attacks on women while there were
41,930 rapes and sexual attacks reported by men. Id. at 62. Excluding homicide, rape is the most
devastating crime for its victims-the emotional scars and continued fear as well as any physical harm
can profoundly affect the victims for years. CHARLES W. DEAN & MARY DEBRUYN-KOPS, THE CRIME
AND CONSEQUENCES OF RAPE, at v (1982).
For a brief discussion of rape in which men are the victims, see Frazee, supra note 9, at 221-22
(reporting that "up to ten percent of all rape victims are men" and noting that "[tihough many have
used examples of rape against men to belittle the reality of sexual violence against women, only by
acknowledging male rape can one understand critical components of male sexual violence") (citations
omitted).
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percent3e ' to about half of all rapes are reported.32
Congressional hearings also showed that, in addition to rape, domestic
violence disproportionately plagues women.3 Accounting for underreporting,
approximately four million American women are battered annually by their
husbands or partners. 4 In 1991, at least 21,000 domestic crimes were
reported to the police each week, which translated into at least 1.1 million
aggravated assaults, rapes, and murders35--more than twice the number of
reported robberies.36 Unsurprisingly, "about 35 [percent] of women visiting
hospital emergency rooms were there due to injuries sustained as a result of
domestic violence."'37 In addition, Congress found that at least fifty percent of
homeless women were fleeing domestic violence.38
The cost of this violence is seen through the one million women each year
that seek medical attention for injuries caused by domestic violence. 39 The
31. Willis, supra note 9, at 2199 n.21 (quoting Legislation to Reduce the Growing problem of
Violent Crime Against Women: Hearings on S. 2754 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1990)). "Rape remains the most under-reported of all major crimes." Id.
32. H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 25-26 (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T. OF
JUSTICE, VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE CRIME 8 (1991)).
33. Ninety-five percent of victims of domestic violence are women. H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at
26.
34. Id (citations omitted).
35. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 37 (1993). "Unreported domestic crimes have been estimated to be
more than three times this [number]." Id. Approximately one-third of all women murdered were
murdered by their husbands or boyfriends. Id. at 41. For a brief discussion of the underreporting of
violent assaults, see Choundas, supra note 6, at 1086-87.
36. Comm. Print, supra note 25, at 2.
37. Id. at 26 (citations omitted); see also S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 41 (finding that the country
spends $5 to $10 billion a year on health care, criminal justice and other social costs of domestic
violence) (citation omitted).
38. S. REP. No. 101-545, at 37 (1990). An in-depth study of 141 homeless women revealed that
63% had been assaulted by an adult partner and 58% had been raped, reflecting higher rates of such
traumas than those found among a comparable group of housed women. Browne, supra note 30, at 372
(citation omitted). Similar studies showed: 41% of homeless women had been physically assaulted by
a male partner, compared to 20% of the housed women; that 34% of homeless, versus 16% of housed,
women reported spousal violence; and 27% of homeless, versus 17% of housed, women reported
assaults or threats of violence by at least one intimate partner. Id. (citations omitted).
39. S. REp. NO. 103-138, at 41 (citations omitted); see also H.R. REP No. 103-711, at 385
(1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1839, 1851 (finding that crimes of violence have a substantial
adverse effect on interstate commerce by increasing medical and other costs); H.R. REP. No. 103-395,
at 26, (stating that about "35% of women visiting hospital emergency rooms are there due to injuries
sustained as a result of domestic violence"). The Surgeon General reported in 1993 that battering was
the "single largest cause of injury to women in the United States." Easterling, supra note 9, at 939
(citations omitted).
These traumas also result in a number of common reactions, including depression, withdrawal,
and compromised functioning in daily activities. LINDA E. LEDRAY, RECOVERING FROM RAPE 90-92,
95 (2d ed. 1986); see also DEAN & DEBRuYN-KOPS, supra note 30, at 110-12; LIZ KELLY, SURVIVING
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impact that the violence has on the economy is also evident in the adverse
effect that it has on women's participation in the workforce. For example,
some women do not accept jobs because they fear that the hours or location
where they would need to work would be too risky.4" Others cannot work or
are limited in what they can do because the abusive spouse wants to maintain
control over them." Congress also found that "almost 50 percent of rape
victims lose their jobs or are forced to quit in the aftermath of the crime."'4 2
One of the negative effects of these statistics is that national productivity
decreases to the extent that interstate commerce is substantially affected.43 For
SEXUAL VIOLENCE 188 (1988); Browne, supra note 30, at 373-74. One of the most profound reactions
found among these victims is Post Traumatic Stress Disorder ("PTSD"). Browne, supra note 32, at
376; LEDRAY, supra, at 98-99. "PTSD syndrome has been used as an instrument to understand a range
of psychological responses to traumatic experiences, from natural disaster or military combat to rape
and other forms of criminal attack." Browne, supra note 30, at 376 (citations omitted). Some of the
symptoms of PTSD are: difficulty concentrating, loss of interest in activities the victim once enjoyed,
loss of interest in being with other people, and a continued reliving of the rape in the mind. LEDRAY,
supra, at 98. "[S]tudies indicate that perception of a threat to life, perception of helplessness in the face
of danger, injury during a traumatic event, and rape and physical assault for women are particularly
implicated in the onset of PTSD." Browne, supra note 30, at 376. (citations omitted). In many cases,
PTSD is the most accurate diagnosis for victims of domestic violence who are suffering various
emotional consequences from the abuse. Id. at 376. (citations omitted). A 1992 national survey by the
National Victim Center found that 31% of all rape survivors developed PTSD at some time and an
estimated 1.3 million women were still suffering symptoms of it up to two years after a rape. LEDRAY,
supra, at 99. For a breakdown of the rate of PTSD among different groups of rape and other sexual
assault victims, see DORBIN, supra note 30, at 255-56.
40. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 54 (citations omitted). While "42 percent of deaths on the job of
women are homicides, only 12 percent of the deaths of men on the job are homicides." Id. at 54 n.70;
see also Women and Violence: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 101st. Cong.,
2d Sess. 69 (1990) (statement of NOW Legal Def. & Educ. Fund) (stating that gender-motivated
violence deters women from using public transportation and, therefore, "acts as a barrier to mobility,
particularly for those women who have no alternative to public transportation because of economic
constraints"). Withdrawal often prevents female victims of rape from traveling or moving as freely.
DEAN & DEBRT.YN-KOPS, supra note 30, at 111; KELLY, supra note 39, at 199; LEDRAY, supra note
39, at 95.
41. Violence Against Women Hearing. supra note 20, at 117 (testimony of Marcella Maxwell,
Chairperson, New York City Commission on the Status of Women).
42. S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 54 (citations omitted). A study of victims of sexual assaults (i.e.,
rapes or attempted rapes) by someone the victim knew from work, found that 19% of victims quit their
jobs and about 40% suffered negative effects to their performance. Beth . Schneider, Put Up and Shut
Up: Workplace Sexual Assaults, 5 GENDER & SOCIETY, 533, 543, 545 (1991). The study also found
that 17% of 372 randomly sampled women reported at least one completed or attempted workplace
sexual assault. Id. at 537.
43. H.tR REP. NO. 103-711, at 385. Victims' reduced ability to function or the need to move in
order to protect oneself frequently results in lost productivity, underemployment, as well as the loss of
a job. DEAN & DEBRUYN-KOPS, supra note 30, at 112; KELLY, supra note 39, at 189, 196, 215;
LEDRAY, supra note 39, at 91, 103; Julie Goldscheid & Pamela Coukas, Violence Against Women
Affects the Workplace: Legal Remedies for Women and Advocates, 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 195, 195-
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example, Telated absenteeism from work has been estimated to cost
employers three to five billion dollars annually.' Interstate commerce is also
adversely affected by the fact that women are discouraged from traveling
interstate, and therefore, from engaging in employment in interstate
business.45
Congress not only found that profound economic and social costs emanate
from gender-motivated violence but also concluded that state remedies have
responded inadequately to this social ill. 6 Legislative findings indicated that
"crimes disproportionately affecting women are often treated less seriously
than comparable crimes affecting men."'47  For example, there is
"overwhelming evidence.., that gender bias permeates the court system."4
97 (1996).
44. Women and Violence: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 101st. Cong.,
2d Sess. 58 (1990) (statement of Helen P, Neuborne, executive director of NOW Legal Defense and
Education Fund).
45. H.R. REP. No. 103-711, at 385.
46. Id.; S. REP. No. 103-138, at 49. For more discussion of the biases and inadequacies among
juries, prosecutors, and judges as well as the inadequacy of civil remedies, see Intervenor Brief, supra
note 9, at 8-11; and infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
47. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 49 (citations omitted). Congress also found that "[w]omen often face
barriers of law, of practice, and of prejudice not suffered by other victims of discrimination." Id.
Furthermore,
[j]udges, juries, prosecutors, and police officers... may require a woman: to have physical injuries;
to tell a consistent story; to be willing to take a lie detector test, to not have waited for more than 48
hours before reporting the incident, to not have engaged in premarital or extramarital sex, to have
had no previous social contact with her assailant, and not to have reached the location of the rape
voluntarily.
Id. at 45-46. Judges and juries may also demand corroborating evidence even when the law does not
require it, or they may challenge the credibility of victims of sexual assault more than victims of other
crimes. Id. at 45. "Faced with limited time, personnel, and resources, however, prosecutors often give
domestic violence cases low priority and sometimes even try to persuade battered women not to
prosecute." Developments, supra note 16, at 1540.
For a discussion of state responses, including marital rape (immunity) laws, stalking statutes,
arrest policies (e.g. mandatory arrest), prosecution policies (e.g. no-drop policies), and diversion to
counseling programs, and weaknesses in these responses, see id., at 1533-42.
48. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 49; see also H.R. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (stating that "existing
bias and discrimination in the criminal justice system often deprives victims of crimes of violence
motivated by gender of equal protection of the laws and the redress to which they are entitled"); S.
REP. No. 102-197, at 34 (1991) (describing a Florida judge who "commented during sentencing that
he felt sorry for a confessed rapist because his victim was such a 'pathetic' woman") (citation omitted);
Choundas, supra note 6, at 1086-88 ("The failure of the law to take into account the particular
circumstances that make women most vulnerable to criminal assault, the cavalier and prejudiced
indifference with which its application and enforcement are conducted in those instances in which they
are most urgently needed, and the unwillingness of the legal system to view the victimization of
women as a systematic phenomenon rooted in historical patterns of discrimination all extend the
disproportionate nature of women's victimization far beyond the point at which the physical assault
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Women who are raped by an acquaintance are often accused of provoking the
attack49 and seven states still do not consider marital rape a prosecutable
offense." While "almost every [s]tate has passed laws that increase criminal
penalties" for hate crimes (i.e. crimes motivated by bias)51 and many of these
laws provide civil remedies for victims, fewer than a dozen have covered
gender bias as of 1991 52 Federal law has duplicated this neglect of gender
hate crimes, as evidenced by the Hate Crimes Statistics Act,53 which requires
the collection of statistics on crimes motivated by race, ethnicity, national
origin, and sexual orientation, but not on crimes motivated by gender.
has been completed.") (citations omitted).
49. S. REP. No. 102-197, at 47; see also Eileen N. Wagner, The Secret On-Campus Adjudication
of Sexual Assault, *2 (Nov. 1996) ("Illogical assumptions about sexual contact turn the criminal
analysis of rape on its head, focusing the probing element of criminal intent away from the usually
male perpetrator and onto the usually female victim."), available at
<http://www.soconline.org/LEGAL/BRZONKALA> (visited Apr. 7, 1997).
50. S. REP. No. 102-197, at 45 n.50 (citation omitted). Furthermore, an additional 26 states allow
prosecutions only under limited circumstances. Id. (citation omitted) For further discussion of the
prevalence of marital rape and the barriers to prosecuting marital rape, including a complete bar, lower
levels of criminality, and limitations on circumstances covered, see Developments, supra note 16, at
1533-34.
In addition to the inadequacies of state criminal law, state tort law proves an insufficient remedy
for a victim's need for vindication and compensation. See id. 1430-1533 (discussing interspousal tort
immunity, uniquely strict standards for intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, and statutes
of limitations); see also Willis, supra note 9, at 2203 ("While state tort laws may allow victims to sue
for damages, the focus is on the physical injury and not on the additional injury imposed by class-
based animus.").
51. S. REP. No. 103-138,at48.
All hate-crime laws impose harsher penalties for offenses committed because of the victim's
possession of a set of characteristics designated by statute and based on group membership. The
laws differ, however, in two significant respects. First, states employ different methods to increase
the penalties for bias motivated crimes.... [T]he other significant variation ... [is that] state
legislatures have adopted different combinations of the following as the statutory set of
characteristics triggering harsher penalties: race, color, religion, national origin, gender, sexual
orientation, disability, and veteran status.
Choundas, supra note 6 at 1078-81 (citations omitted); see also Frazee, supra note 9, at 188-97
(discussing hate crime statutes and describing different forms of hate crime laws).
52. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 48. "While race, color, religion, and national origin are universally
included in hate-crime legislation as hate-crime motives, twenty-one states fail to include gender
within their statutes." Choundas, supra note 6, at 1081 (citing all 21 statutes) (citation omitted). For an
explanation as to why gender has been excluded, see Frazee, supra note 9, at 197-205. Mr. Frazee also
discusses the problems of simply adding gender to traditional models of hate crime statutes as a
remedy for gender-based violence. Id. at 206-12. For an Equal Protection critique of hate crime
statutes that exclude gender, see Choundas, supra note 6, at 1095-1106.
53. Hate Crime Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (1990) (not codified in U.S.C.).
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B. The Response: VA WA and Title III
In response to these findings, Congress decided to enact the Violence
Against Women Act, which was "intended to respond both to the underlying
attitude that this violence is somehow less serious than other crime and to the
resulting failure of our criminal justice system to address such violence."54 As
part of this effort, the VAWA created Title III, which provides a federal civil
rights remedy55 for gender-based violent crimes in order to help make such
crimes considered as serious as other hate crimes56 and to provide victims
"the opportunity to vindicate their interests."57 Having recognized under Title
54. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 38; cf. Choundas, supra note 6, at 1082-83 ("The frequency with
which women are targeted for violent assault, coupled with the fact that women constitute half the
population, fuels a perception of such acts as essentially random and unrelated manifestations of the
general danger of social violence to which all are exposed.... The reality, however, is one in which
women suffer injury and death precisely because of their gender.").
55. The Act also authorizes $1.67 billion over six years for grants to support state and local law
enforcement and prosecution efforts to reduce violent crime against women, 42 U.S.C. § 3796gg
(1994), for education and prevention programs, 42 U.S.C. § 300w-10 (1994), for battered women's
shelters, 42 U.S.C. § 10409(a)(1994), and for community programs on domestic violence, 42 U.S.C. §
10418 (1994). In addition, the Act establishes two new federal felonies for interstate domestic violence
and interstate violation of a protection order, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261, 2262 (1994), and proposes
amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence regarding the admissibility of the past sexual behavior
of victims in criminal and civil sex offense cases, 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (1994). For a discussion of the
battle that was fought in Congress to obtain an actual appropriation of funds to realize these plans, see
generally Patricia Schroeder, Stopping Violence Against Women Still Takes a Fight: If in Doubt, Just
Look at the 104th Congress, 4 J. L. & POL'Y 377 (1996). See also Schneider, supra note 20, at 1249
(stating that the concerns that generated the VAWA "have not yet been translated into resources for
battered women or a broad range of policy initiatives"). In addition, the Omnibus Appropriations Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996), provides for a gun ban for individuals convicted
of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (1994).
56. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 38. Congress intended to help establish that such crimes are "not
merely an individual crime or a personal injury, but [are] also a form of discrimination." Id. at 48.
Consequently, "[the provision's purpose is to provide an effective anti-discrimination remedy for
violently expressed gender prejudice." Id. at 38; see also S. REP. NO. 101-545, at 41 (1990).
[G]ender-crime victims may be said to be particularly deserving of enhanced protection in at least
three respects. First, their exclusion from the scope of statutes extending heightened protection to
other targeted groups further aggravates the disproportionate extent to which they are subjected to
the harms of bias-motivated violence. Second, the unique resistance and prejudicial indifference of
the criminal justice system with which women victims are confronted tend to amplify the
disproportionate harms of the violence they experience. Third, the everpresent and ubiquitous
threat of gender-motivated violence arguably inspires a fear more comprehensive, invasive, and
inhibiting than that experienced by other types of bias-crime victims.").
Choundas, supra note 6, at 1094 (citations omitted).
57. H.R. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994). The Judiciary Committee noted that "criminal laws
are intended to vindicate the State's interest in the protection of its citizens, not the victim's interest in
equal treatment .... Similarly, State civil laws are not focused on the discriminatory aspect of gender-
motivated crime.... [S]tate tort law was never intended to protect individuals' civil rights." Willis,
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VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act that gender discrimination can take the form
of a lost pay raise or promotion, Congress acknowledged through Title III that
gender discrimination may disguise itself in the form of a violent criminal
attack58
The cause of action under Title III is strictly limited to violent felonies
motivated by gender." Consequently, in order to state a claim, a victim must
show that the crime was generated, at least in part, by the victim's gender.'
This means that random crimes in the home or elsewhere cannot serve as a
basis for a Title III claim.6 ' As a result, Title HI's coverage excludes many of
the "traditional" domestic violence cases due to the difficulty of proving that
the abuse resulted partly from the attitude of the male partner towards females
rather than towards his wife in particular.6'
Title III was the most controversial provision of the VAWA.63 The most
lasting and vehement criticism came from federal judges, including Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and rested upon a theory that Title III would overwhelm
the federal judiciary with allegedly gender-motivated cases, particularly
domestic violence cases.' The federal judiciary did not, however, object to
supra note 9, at 2202-03 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
58. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 38.
59. X at 50.
This does not mean that a plaintiff must prove every element of her injury beyond a reasonable
doubt Rather, the plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence, a set of facts that, if
taken as true, would meet the definition of a felony.
Id. at 50 n.57. "Proof of'gender motivation' under [T]itle III should proceed in the same ways proof of
race or sex discrimination proceeds under other civil rights laws." Id. at 52. For a discussion of the
proof requirements, see id. at 52-54. See also 42 U.S.C.A. § 13981(e)(1) (1995) (establishing
preponderance of the evidence standard for gender-motivated crimes).
60. Violence Against Women Hearing, supra note 20, at 10. As a result, a woman cannot
establish a cause of action by saying, "I am a woman; I have a bruise; ergo, I have a civil rights claim."
Id.
61. Id. at26.
62. Id. at 25-26; see also Frazee, supra note 9, at 190 (explaining that "[i]n acquaintance
situation, especially in 'domestic' situations, proving that one was selected for an attack as a
representative of one's entire gender will prove a nearly impossible burden [because Title mH contains]
... gendered logic that permeates model bias crime statutes").
63. Violence Against Women Hearings, supra note 20, at 9 (statement of Sen. Biden, original
sponsor of the VAWA). Some critics initially asserted that the civil rights provision was
unconstitutional but, after hearings with numerous scholars, that criticism soon dissipated. Id. at 9
(statement of Sen. Biden). Another concern raised but later dropped was that Title III would encourage
women to raise false claims in order to obtain more alimony. Id. at 11 (statement of Sen. Biden).
64. id. at 8, 10-11, 25. For a discussion of this and other federalism arguments for and against the
VAWA, see Easterling, supra note 9, at 943-48. For a discussion of why fear of a flood of federal
litigation arising from Title III is unfounded, see Developments, supra note 16, at 1546-47 (concluding
that the federalism objections to the VAWA that are based on policy grounds "continue to mistake
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Title III on constitutional grounds."
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TITLE III
A. Summary of the Cases
Doe v. Doe66 presented the claim of a woman who had been
"systematically and continuously inflicted [with] a pattern of physical and
mental abuse and cruelty" by her husband for seventeen years. In its
Commerce Clause analysis, 6 the Doe court relyed on United States v. Lopez69
and looked to whether a "rational basis"7 existed for Congress to conclude
that gender-based violence "substantially affect[s] interstate commerce."'"
After reviewing the legislative history,72 the Doe court held that the
congressional findings and reports "qualitatively and quantitatively
demonstrate the substantial effect on interstate commerce of gender-based
violence."73
The court distinguished the federal civil rights remedy under the VAWA
from the Gun Free School Zone Act struck down in Lopez. The court stated
that the Gun Free School Zone Act rested on "only theoretical impact
domestic violence for a family squabble and therefore reflect the antiquated attitudes that the bill aims
to eradicate. When violence against women is seen in its true light .... this reluctance to involve the
federal courts appears to be a thinly-veiled excuse for society's continued refusal to treat violent crime
against women with the seriousness it deserves").
65. Id. at 27-28. For an analysis of the constitutionality of Title III under the Commerce Clause
by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, see S. REP. No. 103-138, at 54-55 (1993).
66. 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996).
67. Id. at 610. The violence included "throwing her to the floor, kicking her, throwing sharp and
dangerous objects at her, threatening to kill her, and destroying [her] property." Id. The plaintiff also
alleged "that the defendant forced her to be a 'slave' and perform all manual labor, including
maintaining and laying out his clothes for his numerous dates with his many girlfriends and
mistresses." Id.
68. -Although the defendants in both Doe and Brzonkala, challenged the constitutionality of Title
IlI under both the Commerce Clause and the 14th Amendment, the Doe court, having found a
constitutional basis for Title III under the Commerce Clause, declined to discuss the constitutionality
of Title III under the 14th Amendment. Id. at 612 n.5, 617.
69. 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995).
70. In applying the rational basis test, the Doe court cited to Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981), which stated the rational basis test that was cited
with approval and applied by the Lopez Court. Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 612; see Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629.
71. Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 612 (citing Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30).
72. Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 610-11. The court reflected upon the "numerous hearings (in which
Congress] ... amassed substantial documentation on how gender-based violence impacts interstate
commerce .... "ld. (citations omitted).
73. Id. at 613.
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arguments" and lacked evidence of the requisite connection to interstate
commerce that was established under the VAWA.74 While the Lopez Court
was left to speculate75 in order to find the necessary connection between the
regulated activity and interstate commerce, the "extensive compilation of
data, testimony, and reports [behind the VAWA show a] ... repetitive
nationwide impact of women withholding, withdrawing or limiting their
participation in the workplace or marketplace in response to or as a result of
gender-based violence or the threat thereof' 76 such that interstate commerce is
substantially affected. Although the authority for enacting the VAWA rested
largely on the "cost of crime" and "national productivity" arguments that
were criticized in Lopez,77 the court reasoned that the Court's dicta was not
determinative of the outcome, as it did not "overturn or limit the rationality
test," which Title III satisfied.7"
In addition to finding the requisite relationship to interstate commerce, the
Doe court rejected arguments that Title III violates the Tenth Amendment
limitation on the Commerce Clause by impermissibly encroaching on
traditional powers of the state or by federalizing state law.79 With regard to
the former argument, the court stressed that while Lopez noted that states
have the primary authority to create and enforce criminal law, federal courts
across the country have not interpreted this statement to mean that all federal
criminal law is unconstitutional.80 Furthermore, Doe found that Title III does
not infringe upon state authority in the area of criminal law enforcement but
instead complements it."' In response to the claim that Title Il
unconstitutionally federalizes state criminal and tort law, the court concluded
that the civil remedy supplements rather than supplants or alters these areas of
state law. 2 Regarding family law, 3 the court noted that the VAWA explicitly
74. Id.
75. Id. at 614 (stating that the Lopez Court had to "pile inference upon inference") (citations
omitted).
76. Id. (comparing the cumulative effect of violence against women to the cumulative effect of
the home consumption of excess-home grown wheat, the regulation of which was upheld under
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. I 11, 128 (1942), and concluding that the impact of the former is at least
as great as the impact of the latter).
77. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct 1624, 1632 (1995).
78. Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 613.
79. Id. at 615-16.
80. Id. at 615 (citations omitted).
81. Id. at 616 (stating that "[t]he Civil Remedy section of VAWA. .. does nothing to infringe on
a state's authority to arrest and prosecute an alleged batterer on applicable criminal charges").
82. Id.
83. Specifically, Title HI excludes divorce, alimony, the distribution of marital property, and
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excludes such law from Title III's reach.'
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State University85 involved a
former student at Virginia Polytechnic Institute who was gang raped in her
dormitory.86 The Brzonkala court analyzed the constitutionality87 of Title III
under the Commerce Clause88 by applying what it determined was a four part
test established by Lopez. First, the court looked to the "nature of the
regulated activity."89 The court interpreted the Lopez Court as critically
distinguishing between the regulation of intrastate activities that are economic
child custody claims. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(4) (1994). Additionally, "[n]othing in VAWA precludes a
victim of domestic violence from bringing a tort action in state court for assault and battery or
intentional infliction of emotional distress. [Title IM] ... is distinct in remedy and purpose from state
tort claims." Doe, 929 F. Supp at 616.
84. Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 616 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(4)). The court also held that the means
employed by the VAWA for remedying the identified problem is "reasonably adapted to its intended
end." Id at 616-17 (citing Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276). The court concluded that given the significance of
the social problem being targeted, the "previously-approved private attorney general method of
remedy," id. at 617, and Congress' finding that existing state and federal criminal laws were
inadequate to remedy the social ill being targeted, Title III is a reasonable means of implementation.
Id. at 616.
85. 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996).
86. Id. at 781-82. For additional description of Ms. Brzonkala's assault, see Brzonkala Brief,
supra note 9, at 1-2. Although Ms. Brzonkala filed a complaint under the school's Sexual Assault
Policy, the school's judicial committee found insufficient evidence to take action against one
defendant, who denied sexual contact. Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 782. The second defendant admitted
that he engaged in sexual contact and that the victim had told him "no" twice. Id. The committee
suspended the second defendant from school for two semesters, a sanction that was reimposed in a
second hearing. However, after a second appeal by the defendant, the committee set aside the sanction
without warning to Ms. Brzonkala. Id. For a discussion and critique of schools' responses to sexual
assault, see generally Wagner, supra note 49.
87. In addition to the constitutional challenge, the defendants also alleged that the plaintiff had
failed to state a claim. Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 783-85. The Brzonkala court held that the victim had
stated a claim under Title 1I1, based on the circumstances of the incident and later occurring events. Id
For example, before leaving the victim's room, one of the defendant's said, "You better not have any
fucking diseases." Id. at 782. Neither defendant used a condom. Id. Furthermore, after the incident, one
of the defendants announced in the dormitory dining hall that he "like[s] to get girls drunk and fuck the
shit out of them." Id After the victim filed the complaint, a friend of one of the defendants told the
defendant that he should have "killed the bitch." Id. The court concluded that the fact that it was a
gang rape, the fact that profoundly disrespectful comments were made regarding the treatment of
women and of the plaintiff, and the fact that the defendants mistreated and disparaged the victim with
no knowledge of her or her personality, supported a claim that the events were marked at least in part
by animus towards the victim's gender. Id. at 784-85.
88. Although the court also addressed the constitutionality of Title II under the Fourteenth
Amendment and held Title 111 unconstitutional under that ground as well, this Recent Development
focuses only on the Commerce Clause as a source of power to enact Title I1. For the court's
discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for Title 111, see Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 793-
801.
89. Id at 786.
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in nature and the regulation of intrastate activities that are noneconomic. 0
While Brzonkala did not assert that the economic or noneconomic nature of
the activity is conclusive, the court found that this determination is "a very
relevant consideration."9' Furthermore, the Brzonkala court contended that
previous Commerce Clause decisions regarding economic activities cannot
control cases, like the one at bar, which involve a noneconomic activity.92
Consequently, Brzonkala rejected the Doe court's analysis on this point. The
court concluded that Doe impermissibly relied on a comparison of the
noneconomic activities regulated under Title Ill with economic activities
regulated by certain statutes that have been upheld under the Commerce
Clause.93 In contrast, the Brzonkala court emphasized that the activity being
regulated in Title III, like that in Lopez, involves local criminal activity which
is neither commercial nor economic in nature.94
Second, the court determined whether the law contained a jurisdictional
element, which guarantees through a case-by-case inquiry that the activity
within a given case affected interstate commerce.95 Although the court stated
that it is unclear if such a requirement is mandated, it concluded that the
requirement may be necessary.96 Therefore, Title Inl's lack of a jurisdictional
element was weighed heavily against its constitutionality.97
Third, the court dealt with the issue of whether legislative findings, while
unnecessary, could support a conclusion that the regulated activity
substantially affects interstate commerce, given no such affect was "visible to
the naked eye."98 Preliminarily, the Brzonkala court stressed that a court
conducts an independent analysis of the regulated activity's impact on
90. Id. at 787. ("[The Gun Free School Zones Act] is a criminal statute that by its terms has
nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define
those terms. [The Gun Free School Zones Act] is not an essential part of a larger regulation of
economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were
regulated. It cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases upholding regulations of activities that
arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate,
substantially affects interstate commerce.") (quoting United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1630-31
(1996)).
91. Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 787.
92. Id. at 787, 791; see also supra note 90 and accompanying text.
93. Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 791-92.
94. Id. at 791.
95. Id. at 787 (citing Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631).
96. Id. at 792.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 787 (quoting Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631-32).
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interstate commerce.99 After reviewing the legislative history, the court
dismissed Congress's findings of a substantial relationship between gender-
motivated violence and interstate commerce as insignificantly different from
the relationship claimed by the federal government under the Gun Free
School Zones Act at issue in Lopez and, therefore, as insufficient to bring
Title III under the Commerce Clause power.' 0
Fourth, the court analyzed the practical implications of holding that Title
III is a valid exercise of the Commerce Clause power.'0 ' Concluding that the
proximity of violence against women to interstate commerce is not
significantly different than that between guns in school zones and interstate
commerce, 2 the Brzonkala court determined that upholding Title III would,
as in Lopez, "excessively extend_ Congress's power and... inappropriately
tip[] the balance away from the states."'0 3 While the court recognized that
violence against women has a major effect on the national economy, the court
noted that a substantial effect on the national economy neither always nor in
this case translates into a substantial effect on interstate commerce.t 4
According to the court, holding that activities which substantially affect the
economy are subject to federal regulation by virtue of the economy's simple
99. Id. at 789-90.
100. Id. at 791. Although the Brzonkala court initially laid out the rational basis test, the court
failed to use this language when it determines that gender-motivated violence against women does not
substantially affect interstate commerce. The Lopez Court made clear that while the Gun Free School
Zones Act does not meet the rational basis test, the Court is not narrowing the test. On the contrary, the
Court stressed that it was declining to expand further the reach of the Commerce Clause, which it
believed upholding the Gun Free School Zones Act would have done. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634.
"Admittedly, some of our prior cases have taken long steps down [the] road [toward giving Congress a
general police power], giving great deference to congressional action. The broad language in these
opinions has suggested the possibility of additional expansion, but we decline here to proceed any
further." Id. (citation omitted); see also Kathleen F. Brickey, Crime Control and the Commerce
Clause: Life After Lopez, 46 CASE IV. RES. L. REv. 801, 811 (1996) ("Thus, the majority at least
creates the impression that it is simply maintaining the status quo.").
101. Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 788 (citing Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632-34).
102. Id.at790-91.
103. lId at 792. The court also stated that "[f]amily law issues and most criminal issues affect the
national economy substantially and in turn have some effect on interstate commerce. These too have
interstate travel implications. However, to extend Congress's power to these issues would
unreasonably tip the balance away from the states." Id. at 793. After acknowledging that the VAWA
explicitly excludes divorce, alimony, the distribution of property, and child custody from the coverage
of Title 1H, the Brzonkala court decided that this fact was "utterly insignificant to the practical
implications of accepting the regulated activity as having a substantial effect on interstate commerce."
Id. For a discussion of this federalism argument against the VAWA, see Easterling, supra note 9, at
944-45.
104. Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 793.
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effect on interstate commerce would permit Congress to regulate "much
activity which should be left to state control."'05 As a result, the court struck
down Title M.1"6
B. A Critique
A closer look at Lopez shows that the holding of the Doe court was
correct. There are several problems with the Brzonkala court's analysis and
these weaknesses are critical to the court's holding. First, the Brzonkala court
placed a significant amount of weight on the economic or noneconomic
nature of the activity being regulated-here, gender-motivated violence
against women.0  While the Lopez Court affirmed that Congress can regulate
intrastate economic activity that substantially affects interstate commerce,'
nowhere did the Lopez Court state that the economic or noneconomic nature
of the activity is as determinative as the Brzonkala court would lead one to
believe."° Lopez simply did not address the regulation of noncommercial
activity that substantially affects interstate commerce."0 Decisions by the
105. Id. If the VAWA were deemed constitutional, the court would be "hard-pressed to posit any
activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate" Id. (quoting Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at
1632).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 787.
108. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630.
109. Brzonkala Brief, supra note 9, at 16; Intervenor Brief, supra note 9, at 18; Kelly G. Black,
Removing Intrastate Lawsuits: The Affecting-Commerce Arguments After United States v. Lopez, 1995
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1103, 1124 (1995) ("Identifying an activity as noncommercial, however, does not of
necessity foreclose its regulation."); see also id. at 1131 ("Even after Lopez, the government could
frame an argument for regulation of other subsets of noneconomic activities that in the aggregate have
a substantial effect on interstate commerce."). Also, Brzonkala misread Lopez when it rejected Doe's
interpretation of Title IU in light of previous Commerce Clause cases in which the regulated activity
might have been more economic in nature. See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 784. The Lopez Court did
not say that such previous Commerce Clause cases could not be applied to the Gun Free School Zones
Act because the regulated activity was noncommercial. Instead, the Court stated that previous
Commerce Clause cases could not be used to uphold the Gun Free School Zones Act because the
regulated activity had not been established as having the requisite effect on or connection with
interstate commerce. Lopez, 115 S. Ct at 1630-3 1; see also supra note 90 and accompanying text.
110. John M. Scott, Supreme Court Invalidates Federal Gun-Free School Zones Act. United States
v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 18 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 513, 530 (1995) (stating that the Court "did
not clarify whether it will allow Congress to regulate noncommercial activities to protect interstate
commerce"); Symposium, 1996 University of Idaho College of Law Federalism Symposium: IMI.
United States v. Lopez: A Commerce Clause Challenge, 32 IDAHO L. REV. 505, 510 (1996) (adapted
from a presentation given by Adam Hirsh) (stating that the status of noncommercial intrastate activities
after Lopez is "very unclear") [hereinafter Hirsh].
At most, Lopez implies that noncommercial activities may receive somewhat more rigorous
scrutiny. See Black, supra note 109, at 1118 (saying that Lopez, by analogy with other opinions,
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Supreme Court that closely predate"' Lopez and that have been rendered
since Lopez," 2 however, support the conclusion that intrastate noneconomic
activities substantially affecting interstate commerce are still within the reach
of the commerce power. These decisions are consistent with the fact that the
Court "has never held that Commerce Clause jurisdiction extends only to
commercial or economic actors.""' 3 On the contrary, it is clear that such
"suggests that activities can be more or less commercial, and the more commercial the activity, the
more likely its regulation will be upheld"); Russel F. Pannier, Lopez and Federalism, 22 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv 71, 98 (Although "it is doubtful that the Court intended to suggest [that the subject-
matter directly regulated must be commercial,] ... [a] less radical interpretation could take these
remarks about 'commerce' as stating that regulations of noncommercial matters ... trigger a
heightened degree of judicial scrutiny."); Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional
Findings, ConstitutionalAdjudication, andUnited States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 695, 706
(1996) (concluding that the Lopez concurrence by Justice Kennedy and joined by Justice O'Connor
"indicated that the noneconomic nature of the regulation was crucial to the Court's rigorous inquiry
about effects on interstate commerce") (citations omitted); cf supra note 109 and accompanying text.
111. See Brickey, supra note 100, at 808. Professor Brickey notes that a year before the Supreme
Court decided Lopez, the Court dealt with a variant of the problem of how the economic or commercial
nature ofa regulated activity affects its viability under the Commerce Clause in National Organization
for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler. Id. The defendants in Scheidler were "engaged in a pattern of extortion
committed through arson, fire bombings, and other criminal acts designed to intimidate abortion clinic
employees and women seeking abortions." Id.
To sustain the suit, the plaintiffs had to prove that the protesters conducted the affairs of an
enterprise-here, the coalition of anti-abortion groups--through a pattem of extortionate activity.
The issue in NOW was whether a RICO enterprise must have an economic motive or goal [and the
Court concluded that it did not].
[A]n enterprise could have a detrimental effect on commerce even though it had no profit-seeking
motive or goal.
Arguments focusing on the economic motive of the enterprise "overlook[ed] the fact that predicate
acts, such as alleged extortion, may not benefit the protesters financially but still may drain money
from the economy by harming businesses such as the clinics."
Thus, the only "economic enterprise" with which the protesters had any conceivable connection
was the clinics themselves. But they were connected with the clinics only in the sense that they
objected to medical procedures the clinics performed. They were noncommercial actors whose
activities disrupted commercial enterprises engaged in or affecting interstate commerce.
Id. at 808-11.
112. See Scott, supra note 110, at 531. Scott analyzes United States v. Robertson, 115 S. Ct. 1732
(1995), in which the Court "upheld the application of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act (RICO) to a business-related crime occurring primarily within one state" Id. Scott
concludes that Robertson may establish that the Court is not determined to expand Lopez and curtail
Congress's commerce power" to include only commercial activities. Id.
113. Brickey, supra note 100, at 807.
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jurisdiction "has been extended to noneconomic activity."'1 14 And in Lopez,
the Court explicitly stated that it was maintaining, rather than expanding or
contracting, Commerce Clause precedent."'
This reasoning is consistent with the fact that while looking for a "rational
basis""' 6 for concluding that gun possession near schools "substantially
affects"" 7 interstate commerce, the Court warned not against the regulation of
noneconomic activity but rather against the regulation of any activity whose
effects upon interstate commerce are "so indirect and remote that to embrace
them, in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the
distinction between what is national and what is local."".8  The Court
explicitly reaffirmed that as long as the effect is substantial, activities that
only indirectly" 9 or cumulatively' affect interstate commerce are within
114. Id. (noting possession of a firearm has been determined to affect[] commerce") (citing
Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 571-75 (1977)); see also Pannier, supra note 110, at 72-
73 (saying that "commerce includes ... cattle walking back and forth in pastures [and] carrying liquor
for personal use in one's own vehicle .... The sample suggests a generalization. 'Commerce' includes
any activity, process, event or state of affairs-human or nonhuman, commercial or noncommercial.");
Frickey, supra note 110, at 712 ("The cases upholding the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 indicated that Congress no longer even needed an economic motivation to exercise its commerce
power.").
115. See supra note 100; see also Brickey, supra note 100, at 811 ("[I]f [Lopez maintains
Commerce Clause analysis], one can only conclude that ... noncommercial activity that adversely
affects an economic enterprise engaged in commerce is subject to Commerce Clause jurisdiction.").
[Tihere are at least two reasons why [the interpretation that the word 'commerce' is restricted to
commercial activities] cannot stand. First, the Court did not explicitly say so. One would naturally
expect it to announce such a dramatic change in the law it had thought of itself as making it
Second, it did explicitly reaffirm the principle that Congress can directly regulate interstate
commerce in any way it wishes, for any reason it chooses.
Pannier, supra note 110, at 96. (footnotes omitted).
116. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1629 (1995) (citations omitted).
117. Id. at 1630 ("Case law has not been clear whether an activity must 'affect' or 'substantially
affect' interstate commerce [but] consistent with the great weight of... case law, ... the proper test
... [is] whether the regulated activity 'substantially affects' interstate commerce.") (citations omitted).
118. Id. at 1628-29 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)); cf
Hirsh, supra note 110, at 510 ("[C]ommercial and noncommercial activities [may not] always be
equal.... At some point... the noncommercial activity becomes too attenuated.... Like many other
things, it is a matter of degree.").
119. Id. at 1628 (reviewing Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1; United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
110 (1941); and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)). The Court discussed the development of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence and the clear and consistent rejection of the distinction between direct
and indirect effects. Id.
120. Id. (emphasizing that although the individual activity at issue in a case may be "trivial by
itself, that was not 'enough to remove [it] from the scope of federal regulation where... [the activity],
taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial') (quoting Wickard, 317
U.S. at 127-28). See also Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629 ("The Court has said only that where a general
regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimus character of individual
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Congress's power to regulate under the Commerce Clause. Quoting Wickard
v. Filburn,12 1 the Court stated that "even if [the] activity be local and though it
may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be
reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate
commerce."' 22 This interpretation of Lopez is further supported by several
federal circuits that have heard Commerce Clause challenges to statutes since
Lopez and have not required that the regulated activity be economic in
nature. 12
Second, the Brzonkala court erroneously concluded that Lopez appears to
require a jurisdictional element, which ensures through case-by-case inquiry
that the activity being regulated affects interstate commerce. 24 Although the
Lopez Court did discuss this element, 25 it only turned to this element as an
alternative way to save the statute because the Court had already determined
that gun possession as a class of activity was insufficiently connected to
interstate commerce.'26 In other words, if a class of activity does not
substantially affect commerce, Congress can regulate the individual instances
of that activity that are shown to have such an effect. 127 This interpretation has
instances arising under that statute is of no consequence') (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183,
197 (1968)).
121. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
122. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1628 (quoting Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125).
123. Brzonkala Brief, supra note 9, at 16 (stating that courts "have upheld both statutes that
contain no jurisdictional element requiring a particular connection between individual violations and
interstate commerce, as well as statutes that regulate non-commercial conduct") (citing United States v.
Sage, 92 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1996) (Child Support Recovery Act); Unites States v. Genao, 79 F.3d 1333,
1337 (2d Cir. 1996) (conspiracy to distribute controlled substance); United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d
675 (7th Cir. 1995) (Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrance Act); United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d
1105, 1111-1112 (4th Cir. 1995) (possession and manufacture of marijuana); United States v. Ramey,
24 F.3d 602 (4th Cir. 1994) (upholding a federal arson statute as applied to a private residence), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1838 (1995); and United States v. Moore, No. 93-5273, 93-5274, 93-5281, 1994
U.S. App. LEXIS 14314, at *19-*20 (4th Cir. June 10, 1994) (same).
124. See Brzonkala v. VirginiaPolytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 787 (W.D. Va.
1996).
125. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631.
126. Id. at 1631 (citing with approval United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971)). Bass held that
although mere possession of a firearm may not be subject to Commerce Clause power, the statute,
which made it a crime for a felon to "receiv[e], posses[s], or transpor[t] in commerce or affecting
commerce.., any firearm" was constitutional. Bass, 404 U.S. at 337. The Lopez Court then stated that
"[u]nlike the statute in Bass, the [Gun Free School Zones Act] has no express jurisdictional element
which might limit its reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that additionally have an explicit
connection with or effect on interstate commerce." Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631; see also Black, supra
note 109, at 1130 ("Still another route to regulation of economic activity is to require the satisfaction
of ajurisdictional element.") (emphasis added).
127. See Brickey, supra note 100, at 823 ("If the class of activities as a whole affects commerce,
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also been supported by several circuits that have upheld statutes without a
jurisdictional requirement.'
Third, although the Brzonkala court correctly statedt29 that a court's
"rational basis" determination may be informed by legislative findings but is
independent of them, 31 the court erred in holding that no rational basis exists
for concluding that gender-motivated violent crimes substantially affect
interstate commerce. This conclusion is supported by a brief review of other
Commerce Clause cases that the Lopez majority discussed with approval. For
example, in Maryland v. Wirtz,13' the Court upheld the application of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, which regulates hours and wages, to employees of
schools and hospitals even though these institutions did not ship goods or
compete in interstate commerce. 32 The Court reasoned that poor working
conditions might cause labor unrest that could "interrupt and burden [the]
flow of goods across state lines."'33 Similarly, in Perez v. United States,"4 the
Court upheld the Consumer Credit Protection Act, which outlawed
extortionate credit transactions (i.e. loansharking).' 3' The Court reasoned that
Congress could have believed that loan sharking affects interstate commerce
because it supports organized crime which "exacts millions from the pockets
of people, coerces its victims into the commission of crimes against property,
and causes the takeover by racketeers of legitimate business.' ' 36 In
Katzenbacht37 and its companion case, Heart of Atlanta Motel,138 the Court
then an individual instance of the activity need not be shown to do so. In consequence, the finding
serves as a proxy for an express jurisdictional element.") (citations omitted); Black, supra note 109, at
1130 ("Where an activity does not as a class come within Congress's constitutional authority,
Congress can nevertheless regulate individual instances of that activity that do come within its power
by including ajurisdictional element in the statute.").
128. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
129. Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 789-90.
130. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631-32. While the Court makes an "independent evaluation" and
Congress "normally is not required to make formal findings as to the substantial burdens" on interstate
commerce, such findings "would enable [the Court] to evaluate the legislative judgment that the
activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect
was visible to the naked eye." Id.; see also id. at 1129 n.2 ("[W]hether particular operations affect
interstate commerce sufficiently to come under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate them
is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question, and can be settled finally only by this Court"
(quoting Heart ofAtlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,273 (1964) (Black, J., concurring)).
131. 392U.S. 183 (1968).
132. Id. at 201.
133. Id. at 195.
134. 402U.S. 146 (1971).
135. Id. at 147.
136. Id. at 156.
137. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
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upheld the 1964 Civil Rights Act as applied to restaurants which received a
substantial amount of food that at some time had moved in commerce'39 and
to public accommodations which provided lodging to "transient guests,"
respectively. 40 In reasoning that generally applies to both cases, the
Katzenbach Court explained that the congressional findings provided a
sufficient basis for concluding that such establishments sold fewer "interstate
goods because of the discrimination, that interstate travel was obstructed
directly by it, that business in general suffered and that many new business
refrained from establishing" themselves as a result of it. 4 ' All of these cases
employed "substantial effects" language.
42
Given this fiamework, there is a rational basis for concluding that gender-
based violent crimes cumulatively have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. Unlike in Lopez, one does not have to "pile inference upon
inference"' 43 in order to see the relationship between gender-motivated
138. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
139. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 305. The district court held that the restaurant's 46% of food that
had at one point moved in commerce satisfied the substantial portion test. Id. at 296-97.
140. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 247,252.
141. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 300.
142. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 189, 196 n.27 (1968); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146,
152 (1971); Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 302; Heart ofAtlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 250, 252, 255, 258. For
a discussion about the ambiguity regarding whether the Court has adopted an "effects" test or a
"substantial effects" test in different Commerce Clause cases, see United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct.
1629, 1629-31 (1995); Lino A. Graglia, United States v. Lopez: Judicial Review Under the Commerce
Clause, 74 TEX. L. REV. 719, 727-33 (1996); and Scott, supra note 110, at 519, 525-26. See also
EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983). EEOC v. Wyoming upheld the constitutionality of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act as applied to game wardens. Id. at 234, 243. The case could also be
used to buttress the constitutionality of Title III. The regulated activity was discrimination against
employees over 40. Id. at 232. This activity was considered to exert significant influence on
businesses, which would thereby exert substantial influence over interstate commerce. Id. at 241.
Although Justice Rehnquist, the author of the majority opinion in Lopez, dissented in EEOC v.
Wyoming, his disagreement was not over whether the discrimination could be reached under the
Commerce Clause power but rather over whether the Tenth Amendment limitation on the Commerce
Clause was implicated. Id. at 252. The reasons he cited for the ADEA's failure to pass the Tenth
Amendment test are inapplicable to Title Ill. Id. at 251-65.
In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass 'n, the Court upheld Congress's regulation
of intrastate surface mining operations because Congress found that the mining adversely affected
commerce by, among other means, "diminishing the utility of land for commercial, industrial,
residential, recreational, agricultural, and forestry purposes," by "impairing natural beauty," and by
"degrading the quality of life in local communities." 452 U.S. 264, 277 (1981) (quoting 30 U.S.C.
§ 1201(c) (1994)). The Court found not just a rational basis but rather "ample support" for these
findings. Id. Justice Rehnquist concurred in the judgment and wrote separately only to clarify that the
statute was upheld because the regulated activity "substantially" affected, as opposed to just
"affected," interstate commerce. Id. at 312-13 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
143. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995).
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violent crimes against women and interstate commerce. In Lopez, the
government argued that the presence of guns near schools affected the
learning environment, which in turn hampered the educational process, which
thereby created a less productive citizenry, which in turn adversely affected
the economy, which then substantially affected interstate commerce.'4 While
the Brzonkala court accurately asserted that the substantial effects of gender-
based violence are realized in the economy before exerting force on interstate
commerce, 45  Lopez clearly accepted an indirect effect on interstate
commerce. 146 And, contrary to the Brzonkala court's conclusion,'47  the
congressional findings14 demonstrate a rational basis for concluding that this
substantial effect on the economy has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. Although the absence of such findings in Lopez was allegedly not
independently fatal to the statute in that case,149 the legislative history of Title
III provides the information and link that the Lopez Court needed and was
lacking.150
144. Id. at 1632. The Government also argued that the medical costs associated with crime and
people's unwillingness to travel constituted a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Id.
145. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 792-93 (W.D. Va.
1996).
146. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1628.
147. Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 790-9 1.
148. See supra notes 26-45 and accompanying text.
149. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631-32.
We agree with the Government that Congress normally is not required to make formal findings as
to the substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce. But to the extent that
congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in
question substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect was
visible to the naked eye, they are lacking here.
Id. (citations omitted). But see Graglia, supra note 142, at 767 (stating that the Court invalidated the
statute because of the absence of legislative findings).
150. See United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1363-64 (5th Cir. 1993), aff'd, 115 S. Ct 1624
(1995).
Where Congress has made findings, formal or informal, that regulated activity substantially affects
interstate commerce, the courts must defer 'if there is any rational basis for' the finding. Practically
speaking, such findings almost always end the matter. [However,] [c]ourts cannot properly perform
their duty to determine if there is any rational basis for a Congressional finding if neither the
legislative history nor the statute itself reveals any such relevant finding.
Id.
Insofar as the question [of whether a particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce] is
one of magnitude (an empirical question), the Court is in no position to contradict a (presumed)
congressional determination of the substantiality of the effect. It is difficult for the Court to
contradict Congress's definition of substantiality when it has no alternative definition of its
own....
The Constitution, it is true, has been interpreted to permit judicial overriding of congressional
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Finally, the Brzonkala court erred in concluding that the practical
implications of holding Title III constitutional mirrored those that the Lopez
Court feared would result if it upheld the Gun Free School Zones Act.'' First,
when analyzing the Tenth Amendment limitation on the Commerce Clause,
the Lopez Court did reject the government's "cost of crime"'52 and "national
productivity" '53 arguments. The Court did not, however, say that these
justifications were inherently flawed. On the contrary, Perez v. United
States,"'54 cited with approval by the Lopez Court, is one of several cases that
demonstrates that the "cost of crime" reasoning may serve as a rational basis
for finding a substantial effect on interstate commerce.' Similarly,
Katzenbach and Heart of Atlanta Motel rested on a theory of the "cost of
discrimination,"' 56 yet the Lopez Court cited these cases approvingly because
of the substantial effects on interstate commerce found in them.'57
What the Lopez Court did clearly hold was not that these bases are
categorically excluded as justifications for invoking the Commerce Clause
determinations, but only, presumably, when the Constitution provides a judicially enforceable rule
of law. The Commerce Clause does not provide such a rule, even with the aid of the Tenth
Amendment.
Graglia, supra note 142, at 769.
[T]he Court may give Congress more leeway to regulate noncommercial activities such as
intrastate litigation if Congress makes strong, factually grounded findings connecting the activities
with interstate commerce... Reading the opinions together, it appears that findings would likely
make a difference to a majority of the Court only in cases involving activities with nonobvious
effects on interstate commerce, effects which, once established, can be shown to be substantial.
Black, supra note 109, at 1132-33; see also Frickey, supra note 110, at 707 (concluding that the Lopez
Court considered the lack of findings to "negate one source of potential support for the proposition that
the statute had a rational connection to interstate commerce" and that "the Court did not clearly
repudiate the proposition that formal findings might have tipped the scales in the case") (citations
omitted); Id. at 712 ("[TMhe Supreme Court in Perez signaled that the presence of formal congressional
findings should lead to extraordinary judicial deference in assessing the constitutionality of
legislation."), But see Scott, supra note 110, at 531 (concluding that "Lopez may demonstrate that the
determination of what is 'commercial' is within the hands of the Court, not Congress").
151. Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 793.
152. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632 (The government argued that violent crime costs, through
insurance, are spread throughout the population.).
153. Id. at 1632.
154. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
155. Id. at 154-56; see also United States v. Robertson, 115 S. Ct. 1732 (1995) (per curiam)
(upholding RICO as applied to an Arizona resident who used drug money to obtain and operate a gold
mine in Alaska); Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858 (1985) (upholding an arson statute as applied
to a defendant who burned a privately-owned apartment building); Scarborough v. United States, 431
U.S. 563 (1977) (upholding a statute prohibiting convicted felons from possessing firearms).
156. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel v, United
States, 379 U.S. 241,252-53 (1964).
157. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30.
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power but rather that they were insufficiently established in Lopez to satisfy
the necessary connection with interstate commerce. To accept these
arguments in the context of the Gun Free School Zones case, in which no
substantial effect on interstate commerce was found, would allow Congress to
regulate "not only all violent crime, but all activities that might lead to violent
crime, regardless of how tenuously they relate to interstate commerce."'58 As
reaffirmed by Lopez, the rationality based substantial effects test, not the label
of the association, is what determines whether or not an activity may be
regulated by Congress.'5 9 Lopez supports this interpretation through its
discussion of Wirtz.'" The Court first quoted Justice Douglas' dissent in
Wirtz, which warned that the majority decision might permit regulation of
"[a]ll activities affecting commerce, even in the minutest degree.""16 The
Lopez Court then responded that "[n]either here nor in [other precedents] has
the Court declared that Congress may use a relatively trivial impact on
commerce as an excuse for broad general regulation of state or private
activities," "' but that the regulation of activities substantially affecting
158. Id. at 1632. Likewise, accepting the national productivity argument in this context, due to the
very attenuated relationship between gun possession and interstate commerce, would permit any
activity that affected economic productivity to be regulated by Congress. Id.; see also Brickey, supra
note 100, at 829 (stating that "the Court made clear its position that ... Congress cannot regulate all
activity that is related to productivity") (emphasis added); Black, supra note 109, at 1131-32 ("Indeed,
the decision in Lopez could be seen as applying only where the relationship to commerce is weak in
similarity... effect, and proximity.").
159. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
160. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629.
161. Id. at 1629 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 204 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
162. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629 (quoting Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 197 n.27). Similarly, in Perez, which
the Lopez Court cites approvingly, the dissent criticizes the majority's decision upholding the
regulation of loansharking by claiming that
it is not enough to say that loan sharking is a national problem, for all crime is a national problem. It
is not enough to say that some loan sharking has interstate characteristics, for any crime may have
an interstate setting. And the circumstance that loan sharking has an adverse impact on interstate
business is not a distinguishing attribute, for interstate business suffers from almost all criminal
activity, be it shoplifting or violence in the streets.
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 157-58 (1971) (Stewart J., dissenting). Nevertheless, the majority
states:
We have mentioned in detail the economic, financial, and social setting of the problem as revealed
to Congress.... We relate the history of the Act in detail to answer the impassioned plea of
petitioner that all that is involved in loan sharking is a traditionally local activity. It appears, instead,
that loan sharking in its national setting is one way organized interstate crime holds its guns to the
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interstate commerce does not violate this principle.' For the same reason, the
Perez Court also dismissed the dissent's warning that upholding the
regulation of loansharking permitted the federalization of nearly all crime,'"
which could be said to satisfy the "affecting business" rationale employed by
the majority."s The multiplicity and strength of the effects of gender-
motivated violence on interstate commerce'66 are much greater than those
resulting from gun possession in school zones 67 and it is this difference that
proves critical.
Second, the Lopez Court did demonstrate concern about the Gun Free
School Zones Act's intrusion upon state authority in the criminal and
educational spheres. 6 ' Nevertheless, the Brzonkala court misevaluated the
significance of the concern 69 and the impact that Title III has on state law.
Lopez did not hold that federal criminal law unconstitutionally infringes on
state powers. In contrast, Perez7 ' and similar cases' show definitively that
criminal law is still an acceptable area for federal regulation. Lopez did
conclude, however, that the Gun Free School Zones Act in particular
"inappropriately overr[ode] legitimate state firearms laws with a new and
unnecessary Federal law."' 72 In contrast, Title III fills a gap left by the states
and does not infiringe upon state criminal law. 73
163. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30. The other two categories of activity that congress may regulate
under its Commerce Clause power are "the use of channels of interstate commerce" and "the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the
threat may come only from intrastate activities." Id. at 1629.
164. Perez, 402 U.S. at 157-58 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
165. Id.
166. See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
167. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632.
168. Id. at 1632 ("[I]t is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as
criminal law enforcement or education where states historically have been sovereign.").
169. See Pannier, supra note 110, at 99-100 ("A more plausible... interpretation would construe
the Court's statements [about the states possessing primary authority for criminal law and about not
allowing the Commerce Clause to be expanded so as to be applicable to family law] as merely
indicating that regulations of subject matters traditionally regulated by the states trigger some kind of
heightened judicial scrutiny. If this is the result intended by the Court, then no significant limitation
upon Congressional power has been effected.').
170. Perez, 402 U.S. at 156-57.
171. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
172. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631 n.3 (citation omitted).
173. See supra notes 46-52, 82 and accompanying text; see also Frazee, supra note 9, at 251-56
(listing twelve ways in which a civil rights remedy provides what state law does not).
Criminal statutes, even hate crime statutes, are not an adequate substitute for civil rights legislation
though they can function well in conjunction with each other. Victims do not have control over
[any of these] prosecutions ... When gender is included in hate crime laws, they may not help
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IV. CONCLUSION
Look back at the stories described at the beginning of this article. These
reports are disturbing, but not surprising. Although the acts that spurred each
of these reports may not, by themselves, substantially affect interstate
commerce, the thousands upon thousands of such acts perpetrated across the
country do. Furthermore, granting a civil rights remedy to the victims of such
crimes neither encroaches upon nor alters local remedies. The federal
government has traditionally held a substantial role in guaranteeing
individuals protection from bias-motivated violence; Title III simply aims to
grant this basic civil right to victims of gender-motivated violence as well."7 a
Carolyn Peri Weiss
victims of gender-motivated violence because judges and juries embody [discriminatory attitudes
that work against such victims]. Also, the wide variation of available remedies among states argues
for the necessity of a federal civil rights remedy. State laws cannot create a national standard of
anti-discrimination or equality. More importantly, biases in state laws, as well as the administration
ofjustice which deny equal rights to women, create a compelling reason for a federal remedy.
Id. at 196; Pannier, supra note 110, at 92 ("When Congress criminalizes conduct already denounced
as criminal by the States, it effects a change in the sensitive relation between federal and state criminal
jurisdiction.") (citations omitted) (emphasis added); Willis, supra note 9, at 2202 (noting that Title III
"hope[s] to provide new remedies not presently available to rape victims through state court actions")
(emphasis added). Unlike the Gun-Free School Zones Act, Title I is not "part of a burgeoning body
of federal criminal law, much of which overlaps with or merely duplicates state crimes." Brickey,
supra note 100, at 839. Furthermore, Title III limits the provision's coverage to areas of civil rights
and explicitly refuses to trespass on state law in areas of divorce, alimony, equitable distribution of
marital property, or child custody. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1398 l(e)(4) (1995). The Brzonkala court erroneously
disregarded as insignificant this limitation on Title III's reach. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic
Inst. & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 793 (W.D. Va. 1996).
174. See Developments, supra note 16, at 1547; Frazee, supra note 9, at 255 (stating that federal
remedies "have proven necessary and effective in the past when local jurisdictions were either
unwilling or unable to protect the rights of their citizens").
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